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Abstract: Pain asymbolia is a rare condition caused by 
brain damage, usually in adulthood.  Asymbolics feel 
pain but appear indifferent to it, and indifferent also to 
visual and verbal threats.  How should we make sense 
of this?  Nikola Grahek thinks asymbolics’ pains are 
abnormal, lacking a component that make normal pains 
unpleasant and motivating.  Colin Klein thinks that 
what is abnormal is not asymbolics’ pains, but 
asymbolics: they have a psychological deficit making 
them unresponsive to unpleasant pain.  I argue that an 
illuminating account requires elements of both views.  
Asymbolic pains are indeed abnormal, but they are 
abnormal because asymbolics are.  I agree with Klein 
that asymbolics are incapable of caring about their 
bodily integrity; but I argue against him that, if this is to 
explain not only their indifference to visual and verbal 
threat, but also their indifference to pain, we must do 
the following:  (i) take asymbolics’ lack of bodily care 
not as an alternative to, but as an explanation of their 
pains’ missing a component, and (ii) claim that the 
missing component consists in evaluative content.  
Asymbolia, I conclude, reveals not only that unpleasant 
pain is composite, but that its ‘hedomotive component’ 
is evaluative. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Consider Norm and Abe.  Norm is normal but Abe has been a pain 
asymbolic since a recent stroke.  When we immerse their hands in scalding 
water, both say they feel pain.  But Norm withdraws his hand, grimaces, 
and resents us, whereas Abe leaves his hand immersed, says he doesn’t 
mind, and laughs.  So, unlike pain insensitives, Abe appears to feel pain; 
but unlike Norm, he seems indifferent to it.  Moreover, curiouser and 
curiouser, Abe doesn’t react when he sees, hears, or is told about 
imminent physical threats. 
What does this condition tell us about pain?  I argue it tells us 
something not only about the relationship among pain, its unpleasantness, 
and its motivational force, but about the much-disputed nature of pain’s 
unpleasant, motivational aspect.  In particular, it corroborates my view 
that unpleasant pain’s hedomotive component (as I call it) is evaluative (see 
Bain [forthcoming], Helm [2002] and Cutter and Tye [2011]). 
  
2.  Two Models 
 
The little that philosophers have said about asymbolia conforms to one of 
two models: 
 
Model I.  Hedonic 
Abe’s pain is abnormal.  It is neither unpleasant nor motivational.  
So asymbolia shows that normal pain is composite, comprising a 
neutral pain component and an hedomotive component, which 
contributes the overall state’s unpleasantness and motivational 
force, and which Abe’s pain lacks [Grahek 2007].   
 
Model II.  Non-hedonic, psychological 
What is abnormal is not Abe’s pain, but Abe.  His pain is 
unpleasant—just as unpleasant as Norm’s—and it fails to 
motivate him only because of a psychological deficit of his, for 
example an abnormally high tolerance of unpleasantness, or an 




claimed [ms].1  So asymbolia does not show that unpleasant pain 
is composite, since Abe’s is a case not of pain without 
unpleasantness, but of unpleasantness without motivation, and 
the motivation is missing only because of Abe’s psychological 
defect. 
 
On Model I, then, Abe’s situation is as if a security system detects an 
intruder but fails to sound the alarm; on Model II, it is as if the alarm 
sounds but no one responds [Fox ms]. 
 Neither model is satisfactory as it stands, I will argue, but each 
has something right.  I agree with Model II that one difference between 
Abe and Norm’s cases is psychological.  With Klein, I claim that Abe has 
an incapacity for care about his body, and that this explains elements of 
his behaviour that the standard hedonic story neglects, such as his 
unresponsiveness to visual and verbal threat.  But I think that, by 
advancing this ‘care-lack’ hypothesis as an alternative to Model I’s thesis of 
a missing hedomotive component, Klein fails to explain more notorious 
elements of Abe’s behaviour, for example his failure to grimace or 
withdraw when in pain.  Better, I argue, to retain the idea of a missing 
component, as per Model I, but to appeal to the care-lack hypothesis to 
explain why it is missing, to explain why there is a motivational, hedonic, 
and hence (I claim) phenomenal difference between Abe and Norm—again, 
why what it is like for Abe to undergo his pain experience is quite 
different from what it is like for Norm to undergo his.  My view, then, is 
both hedonic and psychological:  Abe’s pain is indeed abnormal, but it is 
abnormal because of a psychological deficit with wider explanatory 
significance. 
 My view is also evaluativist.  For care-lack explains Abe’s pain’s 
missing hedomotive component only given the following view of mine: 
 
Evaluativism 
Being in unpleasant pain consists in (i) undergoing a 
somatosensory experience that represents (accurately or 
inaccurately) that a part of one’s own body is damaged 
or under threat of damage; and (ii) that experience 
                                                          
1 Klein accepts in correspondence that his is a non-hedonic account. 
additionally representing the damage or threat as bad.  
[Bain forthcoming.] 
 
On this view, the phenomenal character distinctive of pain experiences 
consists not in blank sensation or acquaintance with sense-data, but 
possession of the right representational content.  In particular, a pain’s 
hedomotive character—its unpleasantness and power to motivate 
damage-avoidance—consists in a layer of evaluative content; it consists in 
the experience representing states of damage as bad.2  One of my key 
points in this paper is that we can see how Abe’s care-lack explains the 
absence of his pain’s hedomotive component only if we think of that 
component in this evaluativist way.  My task, again, is not to defend 
evaluativism [Bain forthcoming], but to show that we cannot realise the 
explanatory potential of the care-lack hypothesis without it.  If 
evaluativism is defensible, it illuminates asymbolia. 
 Beyond its intrinsic interest, then, and the general significance of 
the idea of bodily care, asymbolia’s importance is twofold:  it reveals  
unpleasant pain to be composite and, more surprisingly, it suggests that 
its hedomotive component is evaluative.  Before elaborating these points, 
let us clarify the data and desiderata. 
 
3.  Data and Desiderata 
 
What do we know about asymbolia?  Erwin Stengel and Marcelo Berthier 
provide the clearest case studies.3  Stengel discovered asymbolia in 1928, 
with Paul Schilder, and published case studies until 1940; Berthier 
analysed another six cases in 1988.  Their patients typically had lesions to 
their insular cortex, resulting from strokes or brain tumours in adulthood 
[Berthier et al 1988:  41, 47; Schilder and Stengel 1928; Schilder and Stengel 
1931].  Given noxious stimuli—such as pinches, pinpricks, electric shocks, 
and hot and cold water—they responded as follows: 
 
                                                          
2 Like other such identity claims (e.g. that visual experiences’ red-feeling character is their red-
representing content), evaluativists face the objection that the identified features dissociate.  See 
objection 2, §8. 




1.  Avoidance and approach.  All of Berthier’s patients 
exhibited a ‘total lack of withdrawal’, occasionally 
resulting in serious injury outside the laboratory [1988: 
42-43, 46].  Stengel reports that withdrawal was either 
absent or slow and incomplete [Schilder and Stengel 
1928: 147]. 
 
2.  Verbal behaviour.  Berthier’s patients reported no 
unpleasantness [1988: 43, 47].  Some said the stimuli 
didn’t ‘bother’ them or were ‘nothing’ [Pötzl and 
Stengel 1937: 180]. 
 
3.  Expressive Behaviour.  Despite the noxious stimuli, 
Berthier reports that none grimaced or winced [1988: 
43].  (Indeed, some smiled and laughed.)  
 
4.  Emotional reaction. The patients were cooperative, 
and not anxious or angry about the tests [Berthier et al 
1988: 43; Schilder and Stengel 1928]. 
 
All this makes tempting the idea that asymbolics are pain insensitives, 
incapable of pain.  But I agree with Stengel and Berthier that they are not.  
Unlike classical insensitives, asymbolics say they feel pain, even speaking 
of stimuli hurting them and being painful [Schilder and Stengel 1928: 147; 
Berthier et al 1988: 44; Pötzl and Stengel 1937: 180].  And the significance 
of that testimony is enhanced by further differences between them and 
classical insensitives:  (i) they feel and react to pain normally for many 
years before becoming asymbolics [Berthier et al 1988: 44]; (ii) they appear 
to grasp the concept pain [Trigg 1970: 70-72]; (iii) their peripheral nervous 
systems are intact and functioning [Nagasako et al 2003: 214]; and (iv) 
their autonomic responses to noxious stimuli (e.g. increased heart rate and 
sweating) are also normal [Berthier et al 1988: 44].  Hence I call the four 
deficits above the pain deficits, since they involve not an absence of pain, 
but a failure to respond to it normally. 
But that is only half the story.  Not all asymbolic behaviour looks 
like abnormal responses to pain, for it includes what I call the non-pain 
deficits:4 
 
5.  Learning.  Stengel and Berthier’s patients appeared 
even worse than pain insensitives at learning which 
circumstances require avoidance behaviour [Berthier et 
al 1988: 41-43; Klein ms]. 
 
6.  Self-harm.  Stengel and Berthier’s patients sometimes 
approached noxious stimuli, for example placing their 
fingers in flames [Schilder and Stengel 1928:  149].  One 
pricked herself and jammed objects into her eyelids 
[Schilder and Stengel 1931: 598].  
 
7.  Visual and auditory threats.  The patients failed to 
respond to visual and auditory stimuli of a salient or 
threatening kind.  When investigators came at them 
with hammers, knives, and needles, they didn’t respond 
fearfully or aversively. One of Hemphill and Stengel’s 
patients was almost run over because, although he 
recognised a noise as the horn of a lorry bearing down 
on him, he failed to respond. [Hemphill and Stengel 
1940: 256-57, 259; Berthier et al 1988: 42; Schilder and 
Stengel 1931: 598; Schilder and Stengel 1928: 149.]   
 
8.  Verbal threats.  The patients didn’t respond to verbal 
threats.  When warned of noxious stimuli, all but one of 
Berthier’s patients did nothing.  [1988: 42-43.  See also 
Schilder and Stengel 1928: 154.] 
 
Turning from data to desiderata, notice that the pain and non-
pain deficits are not a motley.  They exhibit a consilience, which Stengel 
characterises as a failure to appreciate ‘threats in general’ [Schilder and 
Stengel 1928].  Hence I count it a virtue of an explanation of asymbolia 
                                                          




that it speaks to this consilience, and that it explains why pain and non-
pain deficits tend to co-occur in asymbolics.  Accounts that explain, simply 
and without adhockery, not only why asymbolics are unresponsive to 
pain, but also why they are unresponsive to visual or verbal threats are 
ceteris paribus preferable to accounts that don’t.  But explanations must 
not be too broad:  it won’t do to say asymbolics cannot feel any negative 
emotions, for example, since there is evidence they can [Schilder and 
Stengel 1928; Hemphill and Stengel 1940: 256].  I call this challenge, of 
providing an explanation of suitable breadth, the scope challenge.  It plays 
an important role in what follows. 
 A role will also be played by the following two claims, 
concerning relations among pain, unpleasantness, and motivation: 
 
PU.  Necessarily, all pains are unpleasant 
 
UM.  Necessarily, unpleasant pains are inherently motivational, 
i.e. such as to defeasibly motivate damage-limitation, 
independently of further desires [Bain forthcoming]. 
 
Both seem plausible but are put under pressure by asymbolia since 
hedonic accounts struggle with PU and non-hedonic accounts with UM.  
My own hedonic view captures UM nicely, I claim (§6).  And while, as 
formulated, it is inconsistent with PU, I also claim that it can be elaborated 
so as to pay lip service to that intuition if required (§8). 
 Finally, a caveat.  Although I proceed as though Abe were an 
exemplar of a well attested condition, the condition (if there is one) is less 
well attested than one would wish [Fox ms].  Detailed case studies are old 
and few and report exceptions:  one of Berthier’s patients did respond to 
visual threats, one of Stengel’s grimaced.  Terminological inconsistencies 
also mar the literature.  While I—with Stengel and Berthier—count 
subjects as asymbolics only if they claim to feel pain, others don’t require 
such evidence of pain, and some don’t require any, either not recognising 
a distinction between pain insensitivity and indifference, or recognising it 
but using the term ‘asymbolia’ for a kind of insensitivity.  Hence my 
conclusions should be regarded only as tentative and conditional:  if there 
is a condition of which Abe’s case is paradigmatic, the following is what 
we should say about it. 
 
4.  Grahek’s Hedonic Account 
 
Before articulating my account of asymbolia in §7, I want to consider three 
alternative accounts that fall short:  one hedonic, two non-hedonic.  The 
hedonic view is Nikola Grahek’s.  He thinks, quite simply, that Abe’s pain 
is missing its hedomotive component.  This requires a composite view of 
unpleasant pain, of which a few are available.  One is evaluativism, 
explained above.  Another is Pitcher’s, on which pain’s hedomotive 
component is not an evaluation of represented damage, but a desire for 
the damage-representation to cease: 
  
Desire View 
Being in unpleasant pain consists in (i) undergoing a 
somatosensory experience that represents (accurately or 
inaccurately) that a part of one’s own body is damaged, 
or under threat of damage; and (ii) having a non-
instrumental desire for that experience immediately to 
cease.  [Pitcher 1970] 
 
But Grahek embraces a third composite view: 
  
Damage View 
Being in unpleasant pain consists in (i) undergoing a 
somatosensory experience that represents (accurately or 
inaccurately) ‘the location, intensity, temporal profile, 
and nature of a harmful stimulus’ [Grahek 2007: 2]; and 
(ii) that experience additionally representing the 
stimulus as damaging, or threatening damage [2007: 
80].5 
                                                          
5 Grahek is hard to interpret and might not endorse precisely this, since he seems to think the 
neutral pain (and perhaps the hedomotive component) also has non-representational, 
phenomenal qualities [2007: 81, 95-96].  But he is certainly a composite theorist, hence 





On this view, unpleasant pain’s damage-representing content constitutes 
not its neutral, but its hedomotive component, hence Grahek thinks it is 
this content that Abe’s pain lacks [2007:  80-83].  But whichever composite 
view the hedonic theorist embraces, the question arises:  does the idea that 
Abe’s pain is missing its hedomotive component suffice to illuminate him? 
 I think not.  For, as it stands, the basic hedonic view fails the 
scope challenge.6  That Abe’s pain is not unpleasant explains his pain 
deficits but not his non-pain deficits.  Why does Abe not withdraw from 
visual or verbal threats, for example?  Why does he seem worse than 
insensitives at learning how to avoid injury?  That his pains are missing 
their hedomotive component provides no answer. 
 At one point, Grahek comes close to a broader thesis that might 
seem to help:  that asymbolics’ lesions disconnect their sensory and limbic 
systems, making them incapable of ‘attach[ing] appropriate emotional 
significance” to any sensory representations of threatening stimuli, 
including somatosensory, visual, and auditory representations [Grahek 
2007: 52; Geschwind 1965; Berthier et al 1988: 48].  But even if this would 
explain some non-pain deficits, such as unresponsiveness to visual and 
auditory threat, it would leave others unexplained.  For example:  why 
does Abe not respond when told he is to be injured?  And why does he 
seem worse than insensitives at learning how to avoid injury?   
 Another reply Grahek gestures at is that brains incapable of 
unpleasant (that is, for Grahek, damage-representing) pain will fail to 
store associations between visual and auditory representations of 
threatening stimuli, on the one hand, and either pain or damage, on the 
other [Grahek 2007: 68].  But Abe’s brain’s failure to associate visual and 
auditory threat with pain wouldn’t explain his unresponsiveness, since we 
don’t avoid threats only to avoid pain, as shown by pain insensitives who 
try to avoid damage even while incapable of pain [Klein ms].  And Abe’s 
                                                                                                                       
 
that, ‘pointing to nothing beyond itself’ [2007: 76, 80], the neutral pain lacks ‘representational … 
force’.  But I take his point to be only that the pain’s ‘pain quality’ fails to represent [2007: 95-
96].  Sometimes, interestingly, Grahek sounds rather evaluativist, e.g. his denial that the 
hedomotive component is ‘a coldly calculated informational appraisal’ [2007: 80; see also 82, 89, 
and 92]. 
6 Klein nicely makes the same point in different terms [ms]. 
brain’s failure to associate visual and auditory threat with damage 
wouldn’t explain his unresponsiveness to verbal threat.  For, when credibly 
informed that she is to be injured, an otherwise normal subject will—all 
else equal—believe the warning and, as a matter of practical rationality, 
take evasive action.  Yet Abe doesn’t.  Indeed, he sometimes self-harms.  
Why?        
 So Grahek’s hedonic account fails the scope challenge and his 
associationist elaborations don’t help.  For all this, I shall ultimately 
endorse an hedonic account, but one that substitutes my composite view 
for Grahek’s and incorporates the care-lack hypothesis.  But why bother?  
Why not opt for a non-hedonic, psychological story instead? 
 
5.  U-Tolerance:  a Non-Hedonic Psychological Account 
 
Hedonic theorists say Abe’s pain is not unpleasant.  Non-hedonic theorists 
say it is just as unpleasant as Norm’s and that he fails to react only because 
of some psychological deficit of his.  One such view—call it the u-tolerance 
account—identifies the relevant deficit as an abnormally high tolerance of 
pain’s unpleasantness.  Abe, the view says, is more u-tolerant than Norm.  
U-tolerance is not a stimulus threshold, notice.  It is not the minimum 
stimulus intensity a subject will say causes pain or is intolerable.  Stimulus 
thresholds don’t illuminate Abe:  he and Norm categorise the same 
intensities as causing pain; and while there is no intensity Abe will call 
intolerable, that’s our explanandum, not an explanation.  But u-tolerance 
is a difference idea:  one’s u-tolerance threshold is the minimum degree of 
unpleasant pain that one calls intolerable.  And the hope is that this does 
illuminate Abe.  Enjoying greater u-tolerance, the idea goes, Abe is simply 
tougher than Norm. 
 This account respects PU, arguably unlike Grahek, and it coheres 
with some asymbolics’ testimony, for example a patient of Stengel’s who 
said he was ‘used to’ pain after a lifetime of manual labour [Hemphill and 
Stengel 1940:  256].  But can we really make sense of u-tolerance in such a 
way as to make sense of Abe? 
Something we might mean by saying Abe is more u-tolerant than 
Norm is that Abe is made less anxious by a given degree of unpleasant 




lobotomies for chronic pain.  They claim to continue to feel the chronic 
pain but say they no longer mind it; and yet they still withdraw and wince 
at non-chronic pains [Melzack and Wall 2008: 137].  This suggests that 
lobotomy reduces their anxiety about the chronic pain and its causes 
without reducing the pain’s unpleasantness [Price 2000].  But Abe’s cases 
looks different.  He does indeed look less anxious than Norm, but not just 
less anxious.  For he fails to withdraw or wince even when feeling novel 
pains.  The anxiety interpretation of the u-tolerance proposal doesn’t 
explain why.   
 A second elaboration of Abe’s u-tolerance is twofold:  (i) pain’s 
unpleasantness, it might be said, normally motivates only because we 
normally want it to cease; and (ii) Abe’s lesions somehow prevent this 
desire.  But claim (i) implausibly conflicts with the idea that pain’s 
unpleasantness is inherently motivating (UM).  To see this, we must avoid 
conflating claim (i) with Pitcher’s desire view (§4).  Pitcher thinks that 
what it is for a pain to be motivating and unpleasant is for its subject to 
want it to cease, hence that, absent the desire, the pain is neither 
motivating nor unpleasant.  But the current proposal is that what it is for an 
antecedently unpleasant pain to be motivating is for its subject to want its 
unpleasantness to cease, hence that, absent that desire, the pain is still 
unpleasant, perhaps intensely so, but not at all motivating, not even 
defeasibly.  I think our best account of asymbolia can avoid biting this 
bullet. 
 UM must of course be reconciled with the possibility of pain’s 
motivational force being defeated by stronger motivations, but it is quite 
unclear that stronger motivations are operative in Abe’s case.  UM must 
also be reconciled with paralysed subjects’ suffering.7  But the idea that 
Abe’s u-tolerance is a paralysis limited to the effects of unpleasant pains 
leaves unexplained his non-pain deficits, and his denial that his pain is 
unpleasant.  Indeed, these explananda are left dangling by all u-tolerance 
accounts, including a primitivism according to which Abe’s u-tolerance 
consists simply in his finding pain’s unpleasantness relatively, well, 
tolerable.  Even if intelligible, that primitivism leaves unanswered the 
following two questions:  how does tolerance of pain’s unpleasantness 
                                                          
7 Note the parallels with ethical internalism [Bain forthcoming]. 
explain Abe’s unresponsiveness to visual and verbal threat; and if his pain 
is unpleasant, why does he say it isn’t?8  
  
6.  Klein’s Non-Hedonic, Psychological Account 
 
U-tolerance fails.  But it is not the only non-hedonic account.  Another has 
recently been proposed by Colin Klein.  And crucially it promises to do 
what neither u-tolerance nor Grahek’s hedonic approach could:  explain 
Abe’s non-pain deficits.  Why is Abe unresponsive to visual and verbal 
threats of bodily harm?  Why does he seem worse than pain insensitives at 
learning which situations might harm him?  Why does he sometimes harm 
himself?  Because, Klein says, there is a basic kind of care for one’s own 
bodily integrity that Abe—because of his brain damage—lacks. 9 
 But Klein’s view faces three serious difficulties, two of which are 
now familiar.  First, he must answer a question facing all non-hedonic 
theorists:  if Abe’s pain is unpleasant, why does he say it isn’t?  Klein 
might reply that Abe only means that his pain doesn’t motivate him, not 
that it isn’t unpleasant.  But that looks like a stretch; and anyway similar 
questions arise:  why does he fail to grimace, or to become angry or 
anxious about the pain he is being caused? 
Second, and again like all non-hedonic theorists, Klein 
accommodates PU but struggles with UM, the idea that pain’s 
unpleasantness is inherently motivating.  Now, Klein claims that his care-
lack view accommodates pain’s motivational force better than hedonic 
views.  For whereas hedonic theorists think Abe’s pain fails to motivate 
him because it—his pain—is missing something, Klein’s view is that, just 
as a struck match might have the power to light yet not do so if oxygen is 
absent, so Abe’s pain has everything it needs to motivate (defeasibly and 
absent physical impediments) and fails to do so only because Abe fails to 
care, care being an enabling condition on pain’s motivational force.  But 
                                                          
8 It might be replied that all Abe means is that his pain is tolerable, not that it is not unpleasant.  
But that’s a stretch. 
9 Why does he appear to be less successful than insensitives at learning which situations are 
damaging?  Because he doesn’t care to learn.  One might worry that he should therefore be more 
susceptible to injury than he is.  But  asymbolics are very injury-prone, so long as their 
asymbolia (not always permanent) lasts [Berthier et al 1988: 42-43, 44].  On how care-lack 




our intuition, I take it, is not that pain per se is inherently motivational, but 
that unpleasant pain is.  And at least many hedonic views capture that 
intuition better than Klein, since they claim that pains are unpleasant by 
dint of possessing an inherently motivating component (a desire, for 
example, or a layer of evaluative content) on whose motivational force 
they (unlike Klein) do not impose a psychological enabling condition.  
(This, we shall see, goes for my view too, since although I invoke Klein’s 
notion of bodily care, I take it to be a condition not on unpleasant pains 
motivating, but on pains being unpleasant.)  Now, Klein might reply that 
there is no difference between the intuition that pains inherently motivate 
and the intuition that unpleasant pains do so, since necessarily pains are 
unpleasant.  But what this reveals is that, if Klein has identified a 
weakness in hedonic accounts, it is not that they fail to accommodate UM, 
but that they fail to accommodate PU.  (See §8.)  I conclude that it is 
Klein’s view that unacceptably distances unpleasantness from motivation. 
My third objection is the most serious.  Klein has swapped one 
problem for another.  Whereas Grahek and u-tolerance theorists struggled 
to explain Abe’s non-pain deficits, Klein struggles to explain Abe’s pain 
deficits.  I’ve already mentioned Abe’s denial of his pain’s unpleasantness, 
and his failure to grimace or become angry or anxious about his pain.  But 
the problem I am now articulating centres on his notorious failure to 
withdraw from noxious stimuli.  The worry is not simply that, if Abe’s 
pain is unpleasant, then this failure to withdraw threatens UM.  The worry 
is how care-lack illuminates this failure.  Again, why should care-lack 
disable unpleasant pain’s motivational force?  If Abe’s pain is unpleasant, 
then why doesn’t it motivate him to withdraw even if he doesn’t care about 
his body?  Why should care about one’s bodily integrity be an enabling 
condition on the motivational force of unpleasant pain?  To this 
question—call it the relevance question—Klein appears to have no 
answer. 
It won’t do for Klein to reply that Abe of course won’t be 
motivated by his pains if he doesn’t care about them.  For the care-lack 
view is that Abe doesn’t care about his body, not about his pains.  In a 
sense, it is true, he doesn’t care about his pains, but that is our 
explanandum, not an explanation.  So the relevance question remains. 
 A natural move for Klein would be to appeal to his imperativist 
view of the nature of pain’s motivational character: 
 
Klein’s unitary imperativism 
Being in unpleasant pain consists in undergoing an 
experience with a non-indicative, imperative content, in 
virtue of which the experience commands one to stop 
doing what one is doing [Klein 2007]. 
 
On this view, unpleasant pains are unitary, not composite, and they 
motivate in virtue of their imperative content.  A person is motivated to 
stop putting weight on her sprained ankle, for example, because her pain 
tells her to.  Does this answer the relevance question?  I think not.  
Suppose, with Klein  that imperative contents are normally motivating.  
The question is why Abe’s not caring about his body should make them 
less so.  Perhaps Klein will say that a pain’s content is not purely 
imperative, that the content is not ‘Stop putting weight on your ankle!’ but 
‘Stop putting weight on your ankle or else it will get damaged!’, and that it is 
this italicised, non-imperative, indicative warning of damage that (i) 
normally motivates but (ii) fails to do so if one doesn’t care about one’s 
body.  But this is quite at odds with imperativism’s key motivation.  For 
imperativists invoke imperative content precisely because they think non-
imperative, indicative contents are “motivationally inert” [Bain 
forthcoming].  Hence Klein had better not rest the explanatory potential of 
his care-lack idea on the motivational force of non-imperative contents.  
 
7.  An Hedonic, Psychological Account 
 
Where now?  For all my objections to Klein’s care-lack account, I don’t 
want to jettison his idea that Abe lacks care.  Not only does this explain 
Abe’s non-pain deficits, but Klein makes a persuasive case that it also 
dovetails with prevailing conceptions of the role of the insula, as well as 
illuminating intriguing similarities between the pain reactions of 
asymbolics, on the one hand, and those of schizophrenics, the 
depersonalised, and morphine patients, on the other [Klein ms].  But can 




I think it can, provided we do two things: 
  
A.  Reject Klein’s unitary imperativism for a composite 
view, distinguishing neutral pains and hedomotive 
components. 
 
B.  Reject Klein’s idea that care-lack disables unpleasant 
pain’s motivational force for the claim that care-lack 
prevents pain’s unpleasantness altogether, i.e. take 
bodily care to be an existence condition on pain’s 
unpleasantness, not an enabling condition on its 
motivational force. 
 
This would generate a view—both psychological and hedonic—that says 
(with Klein) that Abe lacks care but (against Klein) that his care-lack 
renders his pain not unpleasant, thus preserving the strengths of Klein’s 
view without the weaknesses.  The view would retain Klein’s care-lack 
explanation of Abe’s non-pain deficits but, by taking care-lack to prevent 
rather than disable his pain’s unpleasantness, it would also explain what 
Klein couldn’t:   namely, Abe’s pain deficits, for example his denial that 
his pain is unpleasant, and his failure when in pain to grimace, get angry, 
or withdraw.  And the account would do all this while respecting UM, 
because there is no need to say that the motivational force of Abe’s 
unpleasant pain is disabled if we can instead simply deny that his pain is 
unpleasant. 
  But making B plausible is a challenge.  For the relevance 
question recurs in a new guise:  why should a lack of bodily care prevent 
pain’s unpleasantness? 
 Imperativist accounts of unpleasant pain—whether unitary or 
composite—cannot answer the relevance question even in this new guise, 
since it is entirely unclear why not caring about one’s bodily integrity 
should prevent pain’s imperative content, which such views take to 
constitute pain’s unpleasant, motivating character.10  Pitcher’s desire view 
is also unhelpful.  It, recall, takes unpleasant pain’s hedomotive 
component to be a desire for the pain to cease.  Applied to Abe in line with 
                                                          
10 On composite imperativism, see Hall [2008] and Martínez [2011]. 
B, the idea would be that Abe’s care-lack prevents this desire.  But why 
should it?  Why should Abe’s not caring about his body prevent him from 
wanting his pain—an experience—to cease? 
 Grahek’s damage view also fails to deliver.  Applied to Abe in 
line with B, it says that Abe’s care-lack prevents his pain’s damage-
representing component.11  But, again, why should it?  Why should Abe’s 
not caring about his body prevent him from experiencing it to be 
damaged?  Damage-representations don’t look care-dependent.  You 
might not care about an orchid yet believe that the drought is damaging it.  
Damage theorists might reply that Abe’s care-lack doesn’t prevent but 
merely disables his experience’s damage-representing content, but this is 
to revert to a non-hedonic view with all the attendant problems we 
identified above. 
Despite these failures, however, I suggest that there is a view that 
allows us to capitalise on A and B and to articulate a plausible 
psychological and hedonic account of Abe:   namely, my composite 
evaluativist view, stated at the outset.  Evaluativism answers the relevance 
question.  Why should a pain’s unpleasantness be care-dependent?  
Because its unpleasantness—its hedomotive component—consists in a 
layer of evaluative content by dint of which it represents states of damage 
as bad; and a pain will represent damaged states as bad only to a subject 
who cares about her own body.  Bodily care, in short, is a condition on 
one’s pain possessing the evaluative content that constitutes its 
unpleasant, motivating character.  To be clear, I conceded—indeed, I 
insisted—that bodily states could strike Abe as damaging even while he 
fails to care about his body.  But, if he doesn’t care about his body, they 
won’t strike him as bad, hence won’t be unpleasant, hence won’t motivate 
avoidance behaviour.  Evaluativism answers the relevance question.12 
 Unpleasant pains are not the only evaluations that depend on a 
given kind of care.  Consider fear.  Though you and I both watch a rock 
falling towards a vase, it might be that only you fear it because only you 
                                                          
11 If unpleasantness instead consists in non-representational qualia, as Grahek sometimes seems 
to think (see note 5 above), the relevance question would be even harder to answer. 
12 The point is not that ‘pain’s unpleasantness = pain’s possession of the right evaluative content’ 
holds only for those who care, but that pains will have that evaluative content, hence be 




care about the vase.13  Why might care make this difference?  Because, I 
suggest, fear too is evaluative, representing the danger that x poses to y as 
bad, and one’s experientially representing the danger posed to y as bad 
requires one to care about y.  Hence this contrast between you and me in 
the fear case is much like the contrast I am drawing between Norm and 
Abe in the pain case:  they both have pain experiences representing their 
bodies as damaged, but only Norm cares about his body, hence only his 
pain represents the damage as bad, so only his pain is unpleasant and 
motivating. 
 Let’s take stock.  Klein claims that one difference between Abe 
and Norm is that Abe cannot care about his body.  I agree.  And I agree 
that this explains Abe’s non-pain deficits, for example his 
unresponsiveness to visual or verbal threat.  But I have insisted that, for 
his care-lack also to explain his pain deficits, it must determine a further 
difference between him and Norm.  It must—and, given evaluativism, 
will—determine an hedonic, hence (I claim) a phenomenal difference 
between them.  Things feel different to Abe and Norm:  Norm’s pain is 
unpleasant, Abe’s is not.  That is why Abe denies his pain is unpleasant 
and fails to grimace.  And that is also why he fails to withdraw.  His not 
caring about his body suffices to explain that failure only because it 
renders his pain not unpleasant.  Thus, at last, the scope challenge is met.  
And it is met while respecting UM, since care on this account is a 
condition not on unpleasantness motivating, but on a pain being 
unpleasant.   
 
8.  Objections 
 
In closing, I consider four objections. 
 
Objection 1.   Non-hedonic accounts violate UM and hedonic accounts 
violate PU.  Why prefer the latter? 
  
                                                          
13 The example is Helm’s [2002].  He takes a similar view of pain but ignores asymbolia and 
seems to resist crediting unpleasant pain with the composite structure that I think is essential to 
explaining asymbolia. 
As formulated, my hedonic account does indeed violate PU.  That is the 
price of taking Abe’s testimony at face value, since he says he feels a pain 
that is not unpleasant.  But if keeping PU and not taking his testimony at 
face value is preferred, a variant of my view can be produced by claiming 
that ‘pain’ applies not to an unpleasant pain’s neutral component, but only 
to the whole composite.  That would mean that Abe is wrong to say he 
feels pain, but this commitment is surely no worse than the non-hedonic 
theorist’s claim that Abe is wrong to deny his pain is unpleasant; and, 
moreover, it continues to preserve UM.  Further, even though not taking 
Abe’s report of pain at face value, the view could still take that report 
seriously, since the story would be that Abe undergoes a neutral 
experience that (i) would have counted as a pain had it been accompanied 
by the usual hedomotive component and (ii) is sufficiently distinctive of 
paradigmatic cases of pain to explain (if not vindicate) his report of pain.   
 But why fight for UM?  Is it not refuted by other cases?14  Not 
obviously.  The putative counterexamples are inconclusive at best.  While 
the lobotomised say pain doesn’t bother them, for instance, arguably they 
mean only that it doesn’t make them anxious.  And while masochists seem 
to seek pain, arguably their pain is either not unpleasant or its 
motivational force is defeated by stronger motivations, perhaps for 
humiliation.  In any event, my view’s principal motivation is not that it 
vindicates UM, but that it meets the scope challenge. 
 
Objection 2.  My view is too strong.  There are unpleasant, motivating 
pains (and other experiences) which it predicts ought to be neutral and 
unmotivating.  Hence either pain’s hedomotive component does not 
consist in evaluative content or such content is not care-dependent.  
 
It might be said, for example, that the lobotomised, the suicidal, and those 
who hate their bodies lack care and yet experience unpleasant, motivating 
pains anyway.  But I deny they lack care.  To commit suicide is to override 
                                                          
14 Corns [forthcoming] argues that ‘hedonic tone’ and ‘aversive valence’ doubly dissociate.  But 
(i) the bearing of her argument on UM, as I understand it, is debatable since she takes even 
unconscious states to have ‘hedonic tone’; (ii) UM allows anti-damage motivations to dissociate 
from unpleasant pains; and (iii) Corns concedes that examples of dissociation in the opposite 




care for your body, not to lack it.  Nor does hating how your body looks, 
or even being disgusted by it, involve not caring about it.15  As for the 
lobotomised, either their pains are not unpleasant or—more plausibly, 
given how much else they are relaxed about—their lack of anxiety about 
their chronic pain reflects something other than a lack of care for their 
bodily integrity. 
 A variant of the present objection concerns not pain, but thirst.  If 
it is by dint of their evaluative content that pains are unpleasant and 
motivating, the worry goes, the same must be true of thirst sensations; and 
yet Abe has thirst sensations that motivate him to drink [Schilder and 
Stengel 1928:  150].  In reply, there are three options.  We might resist 
extending evaluativism beyond pain to thirst, or demand more evidence 
before conceding that Abe is motivated to drink in the normal way by 
hedonic thirst sensations.  Or, finally, we might distinguish kinds of bodily 
care.  Abe, the idea goes, lacks the kind underlying the hedomotive 
component of pain, but not the kind that underlies the hedomotive 
component of thirst.  The former, perhaps, is care that one’s body not be 
damaged (call this d-care), the latter is care that its needs are met (n-care).  
Normal subjects, of course, both d-care and n-care, and they n-care partly 
because they d-care, since unmet needs cause damage.  But, the idea goes, 
Abe is not normal but brain damaged; and he is brain damaged in such a 
way as to prevent d-care but not n-care, thus preventing the hedomotive 
component only of his pain, not of his thirst. 
 
Objection 3.  Evaluative content is not care-dependent.  A might believe 
that damage to B’s body is bad even while not caring about B’s bodily 
integrity.16 
 
There are indeed various senses of ‘bad’ in which A might, despite her 
indifference, believe that a state of B’s body is bad.  She might believe that 
the state is a state of damage, that it impedes the proper functioning of B’s 
body, that the damage is severe, and that it is contrary to B’s interests.  But 
                                                          
15 Alien limb cases may seem more problematic.  For a helpful discussion of this condition’s 
bearing on Klein’s and my care-lack hypothesis, see de Vignemont [ms]. 
16 If we retreat to the idea that care is an enabling condition on such content’s motivational force, 
we revert to a non-hedonic view, which faces now-familiar objections.  
such beliefs are not what I am invoking to explain pain’s unpleasantness.  
I am invoking episodes in which badness in another, normative sense is 
represented experientially, episodes in which the subject is struck that 
certain states of damage to her own body are to-be-avoided [Oddie 2005: 42; 
Helm 2002: 21].  It is these episodes that care-lack prevents. 
Like fear, mentioned above, desire is instructive in this context.  I 
argue elsewhere that evaluativism is required to explain how unpleasant 
pains can be motivating reasons:  episodes that motivate behaviour in 
such a way as to allow sense to be made of it in terms of the reasons for 
which it was performed [Bain forthcoming].  Others similarly argue that 
desires too can be motivating reasons only if they are evaluative 
experiences, in which subjects are struck by the goodness of what is desired 
[Stampe 1987; Helm 2002; Oddie 2005].  And, like me, these theorists tend 
to take such evaluative experiences to be care-dependent.  Dennis Stampe, 
for example, claims that one might believe that the end of a distant war 
would be good without caring enough to want it—without, that is, caring 
enough to produce ‘a perceptual state in which that thing seems good’ 
[1987: 357-8, 359].  It is in much the same way, I claim, that Abe’s not 
caring prevents his pain experience from representing his bodily state as 
(in the relevant sense) bad.17,18 
 A full defence of evaluativism would need to say more, of course, 
not least about the metaphysics of badness (on which there are a range of 
options, from realism to eliminativism).   But all I need here is that bodily 
states can perceptually seem bad in the relevant sense, and that such 
representation is care-dependent.  I don’t have a psychosemantics to prove 
they can and it is; but nor do I see a compelling reason to deny this.19   
 
                                                          
17 Helm similarly thinks that differences in ‘background concern … for one’s [own] safety and 
integrity’ can explain differences between pleasant and painful experiences [2002: 16-17, 22-23]. 
18 This, I suggest, is a more compelling response to the relevance question than the following 
point that Klein might make:  that natural selection might have made imperative contents 
causally depend on bodily care.  But it is unobvious why natural selection should make 
imperative contents care-dependent.  My account, by contrast, appeals not to natural selection 
but to a constitutive connection between care and evaluation. 
19 Cutter and Tye [2011] provide a ‘tracking’ psychosemantics, but arguably identify damage 
and badness, unlike me.  For gestures at other accounts, see Helm on pain [2002: 23] and 




Objection 4.   The relationship between care and desire (or motivation 
more generally) makes my explanation of Abe either (i) trivial, (ii) 
excessively demanding, or (iii) otiose. 
 
To begin with (i), the worry is that bodily care is a motivational state—an 
inclination to avoid bodily damage—hence that my care-lack explanation 
of Abe is trivial:  he is unmotivated to avoid bodily damage because he is 
unmotivated to avoid bodily damage.  But my account comes to more 
than that.  For one thing, bodily care is not a mere inclination to avoid 
bodily damage.  It is a standing, non-episodic state, one that is non-
conceptual yet itself evaluative.20  For another thing, the explanandum that 
the care-lack hypothesis illuminates, I have argued, encompasses more 
than Abe’s being unmotivated to avoid damage.  Care-lack explains his 
being unmotivated to avoid damage partly via explaining his pain’s not 
being unpleasant, which in turn explains his failure to grimace or to resent 
those who gratuitously cause him pain. 
 Moving to (ii), my opponent might complain that, if bodily care 
is more that an inclination to avoid damage, then it is (or entails) a desire, 
and that making desires a condition on unpleasant pain is too demanding, 
ruling out suffering in non-human animals.  But, although I have just 
resisted the idea that care is a mere disposition, the alternative conception 
that I sketched is undemanding.21  And, it is worth adding that, unlike 
Pitcher, I do not require the possession of desires targeted at pains or other 
mental states.  Rather, on my account, the intentional objects of care and 
the hedomotive component of pains are bodies and states of damage.   
Moving finally to (iii), my opponent might again insist that care 
is a motivational state, hence complain that my appeal to a difference in 
evaluative content between Abe and Norm’s experiences is otiose.  The 
difference in care alone—or in desires explained by the difference in 
care—is explanation enough.  But, again, I have argued that the difference 
between Abe and Norm includes an hedonic, phenomenal difference.  
And this difference cannot be identical to Norm’s having and Abe’s lacking 
                                                          
20 See Helm [2002] on care as a standing evaluation.  Note that care is also not merely a 
disposition to undergo unpleasant pains when damaged. 
21 Another option is to say that care is conceptual and invoke some non-conceptual ‘proto-care’ 
that plays a similar role in beings without concepts.   
bodily care, since care is not itself unpleasant.  (If it were, then Norm 
would always be in an unpleasant state.)  My opponent may ask:  might a 
difference in desires explained by a difference in care not be enough to 
make sense of Abe and Norm?  Only if that desiderative or motivational 
difference is an hedonic, phenomenal difference.  And, if that is granted, 
my putative opponent and I need no longer disagree.  For my view is 
precisely that  some care-dependent anti-damage motivation of Norm’s 
renders his pain motivating and unpleasant.  Yes, I have characterised that 
motivation as an experiential representation of the badness of a state of 
damage, not as a desire for the damage to cease.  But, on some views of 
desire, the motivation I invoke is a desire—a felt, unpleasant desire—and, 





In conclusion, I have defended a view on which Abe’s pain is abnormal (as 
per the hedonic story) because he is abnormal (as per the non-hedonic 
story).  His pain lacks a hedomotive component because he lacks care.  
Incorporated into an hedonic account, care-lack promises to explain not 
only Abe’s failure to withdraw from visual and verbal threat, but his 
denial that his pain is unpleasant, and his failure to grimace, get angry, or 
withdraw from pain-causing stimuli.  And it promises to explain this while 
respecting a tight link between pain’s unpleasantness and motivation.  To 
realise this promise, we need to connect care and pain’s hedomotive 
component, and this require evaluativism.  So, if evaluativism is 
defensible, it has a surprising virtue:  being indispensable to our best 
account of asymbolia.  In short, asymbolia suggests the following:  contra 
Klein, that unpleasant pain has a composite structure; and contra Klein, 
Grahek, and Pitcher, that the structure’s hedomotive component is 
evaluative.23  
                                                          
22 This is compatible with my saying that taking unpleasant pains to involve desires without 
evaluative content fails to accommodate their rationalising role [Bain forthcoming]. 
23 I am grateful for comments and discussion to Murat Aydede, Michael Brady, Jennifer Corns, 
Emma Fox, Frederique de Vignemont, Colin Klein, Andrew Wright, and two anonymous 
referees, as well as audiences at the University of Edinburgh, University of Glasgow, Ruhr-
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